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NOTES AND COMMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: PRIMARY JURISDICTION... F.P.C.
As a result of two cases decided the same day in the United
States Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit,' the Federal Power Commis-
sion has been called upon for the first time? to decide whether or
not it has jurisdiction, under the Natural Gas Act,' over payments
of gas royalty under an oil and gas lease. The court held that the
question is one for the Commission's primary jurisdiction.
.. M. Huber Corporation v. Denham4 was an action by natural
gas lessors for damages on the ground that the corporate lessee
had breached and was continuing to breach contractual obligations
under royalty clauses of three leases. The trial court found for the
plaintiffs. On appeal, it was held that the evidence sustained the
finding that the terms "market price" and "market value" in the
leases were intended in their ordinary sense and not as synonymous
with or identical to proceeds received by the lessee-producer under
its contract with its pipeline purchaser and that it was appropriate
for the Federal Power Commission rather than the Court of Ap-
peals to initially determine jurisdiction of the Commission over
royalty payments. The case was affirmed in part and remanded
in part.
Unlike Huber, Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Com-
pany' involved an action between a landowner-lessor and a lessee-
producer who was also the purchaser of the gas for resale in
interstate commerce. Grounds for the action were that royalty
payments for gas taken did not come up to "market value' which
the lessors were to be paid under their lease and that the lessee
under-produced the lease by failing to exercise diligence in mar-
keting gas available from the lease. After a verdict for the lessors
on the underproduction question and for the lessee-producer on
'J. M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104 (5th Cit. 1966); Wey-
mouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F. 2d 84 (5th Cit. 1966).
2See two isolated exceptions: In re Northern Natural Gas Producing
Co. (unreported) 6 Oil and Gas Reporter 538 (1956); In re Elk
River Coal & Lumber Co. (unreported) 6 Oil and Gas Reporter 538
(1956).
'The Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1952).
'J. M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, supra note 1.
'Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas. Co., supra note 1.
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the "market value" question, a partial new trial was granted for
evidentiary reasons. There the jury returned a verdict which in-
creased the amount of the lessor's judgment. The lower court
decision was affirmed on the question of market value but reversed
on the question of underproduction for lack of evidence. The
court, holding that a sale of gas for resale in interstate commerce
must be examined in the light of the practical realities of the gas
industry, ruled that, as in Huber, the question as to whether the
F.P.C. has jurisdiction over payments of royalty must first be ruled
on by the Commission.
"Primary Jurisdiction" applies where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforce-
ment of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence
of an administrative body for its views.' It has effectively been
used to secure a prior determination by an agency, acting under a
regulatory authority, of the scope and meaning of the statute so
that a court can better apply the statute to the circumstances of
a particular case.!
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has developed to a great
extent in transportation cases, antitrust cases, and N.L.R.B. cases
and has grown significantly with the development of administra-
tive law. The 5th Circuit has ordered primary jurisdiction refer-
ence with respect to the legal validity of tariffs,5 questions in-
volving the interplay of the Interstate Commerce Act and the
Agricultural Marketing Act,9 and the question of whether the
validity of a tariff is justification for action claimed to violate
the antitrust laws."
Factors involved in determining that an agency should ex-
ercise primary jurisdiction are securing uniformity and consistency
'U.S. v. Western Pac R.R., 352 U.S. 59, at 63-64 (1956).
7 Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandsten Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
8Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River Terminals Corp., 360 U.S.
411 (1958).
9Agricultural Trans. Ass'n. v. King, 349 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1965);
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Knox Homes Corp., 343 F.2d 887 (5th
Cir. 1965).
'
0 Carter v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 365 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1966).
[Vol. 4, No. 2
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in the regulation of business entrusted to a particular agency and
more rationally exercising the limited functions of review by the
judiciary." The purpose of the doctrine is not to divide powers
between courts and agencies but only to determine which tribunal
should take initial action."1
Where the real question is the scope of the agency's authority,
it is well established that an agency has jurisdiction to make the
determination." N.L.R.B. cases have held that if a labor dispute
is "arguably" subject to the jurisdiction of the N.L.R.B. then the
courts are not free, without a prior board determination, to de-
termine the question of whether the dispute is beyond the power
of the Board.'4
The Federal Power Commission for sixteen years did not ex-
tend its jurisdiction to producers of natural gas, but in Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin," extended its jurisdiction to cover
the rates received by producers who sold their gas for resale in
interstate commerce. The Phillips case in broad terms recognized
F.P.C. jurisdiction "over the rates of all wholesales of natural gas
in interstate commerce, whether by a pipeline company or not
and whether occurring before, during or after transmission by an
interstate pipeline company.""
Since the producers of natural gas, who sell their gas to inter-
"See Far East Conference v. U.S., 342 U.S. 570 (1952); U.S. Navigation
Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932); Keogh v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922). Contra, Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
324 U.S. 439 (1945).
"Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334 (1963); General
Am. Tank Car Corp. v. ElDorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422 (1940).
'
3FPC v. Ark. Power and Light Co., 330 U.S. 802 (1947); Sunshine
Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940); Texas & Pac.
Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907); U.S. v. Sing
Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 (1904).
"
4Local 438 Constr. Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963); Incres S.S.
Co. v. Int'l Maritime Workers Union, 372 U.S. 24 (1963); Marine
Engineers Beneficial Ass'n v. Interlake S.S. Co., 370 U.S. 173 (1962);
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959);
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
15Philips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
'
6 Id. at 682.
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state pipeline companies, by far outnumber their purchasers, one
result of the Phillips case was to add heavily to the case load of
the Commission. The Commission amended its rules to specifically
include an "independent producer." 7 Now each operator of a
producing unit is required to file a rate schedule and an applica-
tion for a certificate of public convenience and necessity on its
own behalf, on behalf of all non-operators who are signatory par-
ties to a gas sales contract but do not wish to file their own rate
schedule, and on behalf of all non-operators who are not signatory
parties to a gas sales contract cqvering their interest in the gas,
before one cubic foot of gas is allowed to be delivered from that
unit into interstate commerce.
It has been held that Congress "meant to create a comprehen-
sive and effective regulatory scheme" in enacting the Natural Gas
Act,'8 and that when Congress enacted the Natural Gas Act, it
was motivated by a desire "to protect consumers against exploita-
tion at the hands of natural gas companies."" The Supreme Court
has upheld the Commission's extension of jurisdiction to cover
not only direct sales of natural gas for resale in interstate com-
merce, but also sales of gas which is commingled with gas sold
for resale in interstate commerce."
The lessors in Huber made a strong argument based on the
contention that there can be no "sale of gas by royalty owners
since they have no gas to sell."21 They argued that as the gas leaves
the wellhead, the entire ownership of the gas is in the lessee and
that at this point a simple debtor-creditor relationship exists be-
tween a lessee-producer and the lessors.'
1718 C.F.R. § 154.91 (1956, Supp. 1966) Regulations Under the Natural
Gas Act.
"See United Gas Improvement Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 381 U.S.
392, at 400 (1965); Federal Power Comm'n v. Texaco Inc., 377 U.S.
33 (1964); and Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 US.. 137
(1960).
'"Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 332 U.S.
507, at 520 (1947).
"California v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., 379 U.S. 366 (1965); FPC v.
Amerada Petroleum Corp., 379 U.S. 687 (1965).
21J. M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, supra note 1, at 113.
'Theisen v. Robison, 117 Tex. 489, 8 S.W.2d 646 (1928). See also
[Vol. 4. No. 2
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However, since the decision in United Gas Improvement Co.
v. Continental Oil Co.,' the Supreme Court has made it clear that
neither the form of the transaction nor the peculiarities of state
law are controlling in determining whether there is a jurisdictional
sale under the Natural Gas Act. Even though the sale was con-
summated before the gas left the ground and consideration for the
sale was a lump sum price, the Supreme Court held that it was a
"sale" under the Act. This result was necessary to prohibit an
apparent means of circumventing regulation.
Royalty has been treated by the Commission as a significant
cost in its Area Rate Proceedings.' Huber and Weymouth both
leave open the possibility of a distinction between royalty paid
on the basis of the proceeds the producer receives for his gas and
the "market price" or "market value" of the gas. If the producer
were required to pay royalty on a basis other than the proceeds
he received for gas sold in interstate commerce, his costs of pro-
ducing gas would be significantly increased and either would have
to be absorbed by the producer or permitted by the Federal Power
Commission to be passed along to the pipeline purchaser and,
eventually to the consumer. A very pertinent example is a pro-
ducer selling what the Commission has termed "old gas" by rea-
son of its being contracted before a designated cut-off date in an
area where the Commission permits gas committed to contract
more recently to be sold at a price six cents per thousand cubic
feet higher. Such an area is the Oklahoma panhandle. The pro-
ducer, limited to selling his gas at a rate of eleven cents per thou-
sand cubic feet, but required to pay royalty on the basis of a
seventeen cents per thousand cubic feet "new gas" rate as the
"market value" would be under a definite economic burden.
If the Commission took this cost factor into consideration and
permitted a higher rate for the gas, the probable result would be
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bynum, 155 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1946);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson, 155 F. 2d 185 (5th Cir. 1946);
Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 558 (1948).
"United Gas Improvement Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 381 U.S. 392
(1965).
"
'Area Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin), 34 F.P.C. 159 (1965). See
also In re Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C. 537 (1960); cf. Wisconsin
v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294 (1963).
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higher gas prices to the consumer. Due to the potential impact on
the consumer it is not unforeseeable that the Commission could
extend its holding in the Phillips and Rayne cases to hold juris-
dictional the amount of royalty payments by lessee-producers sell-
ing their gas for resale in interstate commerce. Such a holding
would be consistent with the regulatory purpose of protecting the
consumer.
Should the Commission decline to assert jurisdiction over
royalty payments, the cost impact on the lessee-producer may be
even heavier. Royalties based on "market value" in the Huber
case would net the lessor an amount in excess of 95 % of the total
proceeds received by the F.P.C.-regulated lessee-producer." Costs
of this magnitude would reduce the incentive to search for new
gas reserves and the development of known reserves. A lack of
gas reserves might defeat the Commission's purpose of protecting
the consumer. Although in negotiating future leases the lessee-
producers will undoubtedly attempt to avoid use of the "market
value" provision for payment of royalty, that precaution cannot
be of help to the immediate problem where millions of productive
acres are covered by leases providing for payment of royalty at
"market value" or "market price."
The holdings in Huber and Weymouth are not inconsistent
with the trend in the development of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, but are significant as they extend the application of
the doctrine into the area of natural gas regulation. They open
the possibility for an expansion of the Federal Power Commis-
sion's exercise of jurisdiction which may be of greater impact than
even the Phillips decision because just as producers outnumber
pipeline companies, royalty owners greatly outnumber producers.
The result would be to place an unprecedented case load on the
Commission and may in itself be a reason for the Commission's
denying jurisdiction. The added case load would undoubtedly
further delay the granting of producer and pipeline certificates,
again adding to the costs to the producer in selling its gas and to
the pipeline in purchasing gas to fulfill consumer demands.
In view of the complex nature of the problems raised in
Huber and Weymouth, the 5th Circuit's decision to refer the
2sJ. M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, supra note 1, at 110.
[Vol. 4, No. 2
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cases to the Commission's expertise is a particularly sound ex-
tension of the application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
As stated by the court, both cases involve both public and private
interests. The impact of the decision will affect a large cross-section
of the economy and, by its nature, necessitates an experience in
dealing with the natural gas industry and a flexibility of pro-
cedure well suited to the nature of the Commission.
Robert C. Murray
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